Mean field master equations for the so-called norm game are proposed. The strategies are: to obey the norm or not and to punish those who break it or not. The punishment, the temptation, the punishment cost and the relaxation of vengeance are modeled by four parameters; for the fixed points, only two ratios of these parameters are relevant. The analysis reveals two phases; in one of them, nobody obeys the norm and nobody punishes. This phase is stable if the punishment is small enough. In the other phase, the proportion of defectors depends on the parameters and in some cases it can be arbitrarily small. A transcritical bifurcation appears between the two phases. Numerical calculations show that the relaxation time shows a sharp maximum at the bifurcation point. The model is adapted also for the case of two mutually punishing groups. A difference between the solutions for two groups appears if the punishment of one group by the other is weaker, than the opposite. More details can be found in arXiv: 0801.3520.

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