Several factors are considered to be important for sustaining cooperative behaviour. These are among others, the net gain from cooperation , privacy of decision, social disapproval or the existence of a punishment mechanism. We propose to discuss the impact of these features on cooperation within the frame of a single model. Specifically we consider that individuals support some moral costs from deviating from cooperative behavior. It is shown that an polymorphic equilibrium with cooperation and defection exist: players with high moral costs cooperate while those with low moral costs defect. The equilibrium with cooperative behavior depend on the distribution of moral cost in the society.We show how attractivness of the group, gain from cooperation or the distribution of moral cost affects the equilibrium probability of cooperation.

1. PRESENTATION: Social norms, Emotions and cooperation in groups, PostScript document text conforming at level 2.0, 0.2MB

• Legal notice:
  

  Copyright (c) Pielaszek Research, all rights reserved.
  The above materials, including auxiliary resources, are subject to Publisher's copyright and the Author(s) intellectual rights. Without limiting Author(s) rights under respective Copyright Transfer Agreement, no part of the above documents may be reproduced without the express written permission of Pielaszek Research, the Publisher. Express permission from the Author(s) is required to use the above materials for academic purposes, such as lectures or scientific presentations.
  In every case, proper references including Author(s) name(s) and URL of this webpage: https://science24.com/paper/14885 must be provided.