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Testing Different Imitation Strategies in an Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Networks |
Petr Svarc , Natalie Svarcova |
Charles University, Faculty of Science, Albertov 6, Prague 12843, Czech Republic |
Abstract |
One of the interesting extensions of evolutionary game theory is to limit the possible interactions of each agent to only the subset of population, mainly to those agents that belong to the spatial or social neighborhood of the particular individual. In our article we thus extend the existing literature on evolutionary games on networks by examining how both the network topologies and the mechanisms, in our case imitation strategies, through which particular behavior spreads in the population affect the evolutionary dynamics of the game. |
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Presentation: Oral at International Conference on Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents 2008, by Petr SvarcSee On-line Journal of International Conference on Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents 2008 Submitted: 2008-03-14 11:28 Revised: 2009-06-07 00:48 |