Search for content and authors
 

The flip side of the Cournot - Nash competition

Megan M. Khoshyaran 

Economics Traffic Clinic (ETC), Paris 75008, France

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the consequences of including environment of players in the Cournot-Nash competition. A two–person non-cooperative game is considered. The environment is expressed in terms of "others". The function of the environment is to maintain its equilibrium. The equilibrium point of the environment is upgraded if the strategies of one or both players have a favorable impact on the environment. The equilibrium stays at its previous level otherwise. The equilibrium point of the environment is called an environmental attractor. The environmental attractor affects the strategies of the players which in turn define the payoff functions and the reaction functions. It is shown that in the presence of an environmental attractor players can not reach a Nash point. In fact the reaction functions of the players act as orbits around the environmental attractor. Thus each player has a finite number of strategies compatible with the environment to pick from. As long as the equilibrium of the environment is maintained, any of the orbits will be acceptable choices for the players. An environmental model of a two – person competition game is given, and the consequences are studied.

 

Legal notice
  • Legal notice:
 

Related papers

Presentation: Poster at International Conference on Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents 2008, by Megan M. Khoshyaran
See On-line Journal of International Conference on Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents 2008

Submitted: 2008-03-13 12:56
Revised:   2009-06-07 00:48