

# The Lehman Brothers Effect and Bankruptcy Cascades

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A firm's financial condition can be described by a single variable  $R$ :  $0, 1, \dots, R_{max}$ . This variable corresponds to a rating class that can be assigned to a firm. By  $R = 0$  we understand the state of default.

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Variable  $R$  evolves in time according to:

$$R(t) = R(t - 1) + s(t - 1), \quad (1)$$

where  $s(t)$  is a stochastic variable and  $s(t) = -1, 0, 1$ .

For a set of  $N$  firms, we define the conditional probability for a variable  $s_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(s_i \mid s_1, \dots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_N, R_i) &= \\
 &= \frac{1}{Z} \exp\left(\sum_{j \neq i} J_{ij} \delta(s_i, s_j) + f(R_i, s_i)\right). \quad (2)
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
$$P(J_{ij}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_J^2}} \exp\left(-\frac{(J_{ij} - J_0)^2}{2\sigma_J^2}\right). \quad (3)$$

▶  $R_{max} = 7$


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





Evolution of a portfolio in  
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 $J_0 = 0.02$ ,  $\sigma = 0.001$ .




Rating scale:  
 $R = 0, \dots, R = 7$




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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 $J_0 = 0.0001$ ,  $\sigma = 0.001$   
(top) and a spin-glass  
phase:  $J_0 = 0.0001$ ,  
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
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
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


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


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





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
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- ▶ time  $t = 8$  steps



Case  $f \equiv 0$ :

Number of defaults (ND) for  $J_0 = 0.0001$ ,  $\sigma = 0.001$ .





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




ND as a function of  $J_0$  for  $\sigma = 0.001$





ND as a function of  $J_0$  for  $\sigma = 0.2$



$f(R, s)$  depends only on  $s$ :

$$\exp(f(R, -1)) = 0.15, \exp(f(R, 0)) = 0.75, \exp(f(R, 1)) = 0.10.$$





An external field which model panic after a first default:


$$H(R_1, \dots, R_N) = H \cdot \left(1 - \prod_j (1 - \delta(R_j, 0))\right). \quad (4)$$

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

$$H(R_1, \dots, R_N) = H \cdot (1 - \prod_j (1 - \delta(R_j, 0))). \quad (4)$$

This field takes a value  $H$  if there is at least one bankrupt among all nodes and is equal to 0 in the remaining cases. The modified conditional probability for a variable  $s_i$ ,  $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} P(s_i \mid s_1, \dots, s_{i-1}, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_N, R_i) &= \\ &= \frac{1}{Z} \exp\left(\sum_{j \neq i} J_{ij} \delta(s_i, s_j) + H(R_1, \dots, R_N) \delta(s_i, -1)\right). \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$



Number of defaults (ND) as a function of  $J_0$  for different values of the field amplitude  $H$ .




Evolution of  $ND(t)$  in time for:

- ▶  $J_0N = 0.1, H = 0.08$
- ▶  $J_0N = 5, H = 0.08$ .



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- ▶ We used a concept of Potts spin-glass to model collective firm bankruptcies
- ▶ There is an optimal value of system coupling for system stability
- ▶ The presence of panic field (Lehman Brothers bank effect) is most crucial at the transition point
- ▶ Helping the first bankrupts leads to a delay of the global economy collapse

Ref: P. Siczka, J.A. Holyst, Eur. Phys. Journ. B 71, 461 (2009)  
P. Siczka, D. Sornette, J.A. Holyst, Swiss Finance Institute ,  
Research Paper Series N 10-06, submitted to Eur. Phys. Journ. B  
(2010)