We consider ghetto as a community of people ruled against their will by an external power. Members of the community feel that their laws are broken. However, attempts to leave ghetto makes their situation worse. We discuss the relation of the ghetto inhabitants to the ruling power in context of their needs, organized according to the Maslow hierarchy. Decisions how to satisfy successive needs are undertaken in cooperation with or defection the ruling power. This issue allows to construct the tree of decisions and to adopt the pruning technique from the game theory. Dynamics of decisions can be described within the formalism of fundamental equations. The result is that the strategy of defection is stabilized by the estimated payoff.

[1] arXiv preprint: physics/0512058

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