Reputation-based cooperation – what if errors?

Andrzej Jarynowski 1Krzysztof Kułakowski 2

1. Jagiellonian University, Institute of Physics (IF UJ), Reymonta 4, Kraków 30-059, Poland
2. AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Physics and Applied Computer Science (AGH), Mickiewicza 30, Kraków 30-059, Poland


We explore the model of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, based on reputation [1]. Here, for altruisms equal zero, the probability P(W(k,i)) that agent k cooperates with agent i is assumed as P(W(k,i),a)={1+th[a(W(k,i)-1/2)]}/2, where W(k,i)∈(0,1) is the reputation of agent i in eyes of k and 1/a is a measure of errors of the players. In the limit of infinite a, the game is deterministic. Then, the game has three possible outcomes: a) both cooperate (probability 0.25), b) both defect (probability 0.25) and c) a cyclic series of games where either k cooperates and i defects, or the opposite, exchanging the strategies at each time step. Then, the distribution of W(i,k)+W(k,i) consists of three sharp peaks. For finite values of a, the probability of c) decreases exponentially in time. For small values of a, a crossover is observed from the state where only options a) and b) appear (a = 5) to a homogeneous distribution of W(i,k) at the most fuzzy case a=0.

[1] K. Kułakowski, P. Gawroński, Physica A, 388 (2009) 3581.


Related papers
  1. Influence of temporal aspects and age-correlations on the process of opinion formation based on Polish contact survey
  2. Heider balance in bilayer networks
  3. Hierarchical Partitions of Social Networks Between Rivaling Leaders
  4. New constant of motion for coevolving voter model
  5. Multiples of ten in the survey data on the number of friends
  6. Paradox of integration – mean field approach
  7. Paradox of integration - a computational model
  8. Diffusion paths between hit singles charts in Europe.
  9. No more presidents in my family
  10. The Simmel effect and babies names
  11. Viral spread with or without emotions in online community
  12. Distribution of time lags between pedestrians
  13. Critical slowing down in strategy selection in crowd
  14. More stochastic repulsion in culture dissemination 
  15. Proste modele epidemiologiczne
  16. A line graph as a model of a social network
  17. Time lags in evacuation in the social force model
  18. Bounded confidence model: addressed information maintain diversity of opinions
  19. Social networks and MRSA spreading in hospitals
  20. Anomalous interactions in network of Polish Football League
  21. Indifferents as an interface between Contra and Pro
  22. The Zaller model of mass opinion with interactions
  23. The norm game in a mean-field society
  24. The Sznajd dynamics in a social network
  25. Magnetic ordering in a social structure
  26. Efficiency of social dimerization
  27. Needs and decisions in ghetto
  28. Gossip in random networks
  29. Matrix representation of evolving networks
  30. The Heider balance and social distance

Presentation: Poster at 6 Ogólnopolskie Sympozjum "Fizyka w Ekonomii i Naukach Społecznych", by Andrzej Jarynowski
See On-line Journal of 6 Ogólnopolskie Sympozjum "Fizyka w Ekonomii i Naukach Społecznych"

Submitted: 2012-01-13 00:21
Revised:   2012-01-13 23:37